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The	Trial	of	Hissène	Habré	and	What	it	Could	Mean	for
Justice	in	Africa
Celeste	Hicks	explores	the	trial	of	Hissène	Habré	and	what	it	could	mean	for	future	justice	and	accountability	efforts
in	Africa.
The	legal	vagaries	and	judicial	details	of	the	Extraordinary	African	Chambers	(EAC),	which	sentenced	Hissène	Habré
to	life	imprisonment	in	2015,	was	not	at	the	top	of	the	list	of	concerns	of	many	of		the	former	Chadian	president’s
victims.	What	matters	most	was	the	EAC’s	success	in	reaching	a	guilty	verdict	on	charges	of	war	crimes,	crimes
against	humanity	and	torture	on	a	remarkably	tight	timeframe	and	on	a	budget	of	just	over	8	million	euros.
However,	for	wider	African	justice,	the	EAC’s	status	as	an	ad	hoc	hybrid	court	established	inside	the	existing
Senegalese	justice	system	is	significant.	There	were	a	lot	of	firsts:	it	was	the	first	time	that	the	African	Union	(AU)
had	established	a	court;	the	first	time	a	former	African	head	of	state	had	been	tried	before	a	court	in	another	African
country;	and	the	first	time	a	universal	jurisdiction	case	had	proceeded	to	trial	in	Africa.	Being	founded	at	a	time	when
many	legal	analysts	had	largely	concluded	that	hybrid	trials	would	soon	cease	to	be	relevant,	the	EAC	was	part	of
something	like	a	re-birth	in	hybrid	justice.	Although	the	EAC	has	been	described	as	residing	‘at	the	limits’	of	what	a
hybrid	trial	could	be	because	only	a	handful	of	its	officials	were	not	Senegalese,	it	was	widely	praised	for	its	status	as
an	‘African’	hybrid	court.	In	practice,	this	meant	the	judges,	defence	and	prosecution	teams	were	all	African	and,
significantly,	the	Chadian	victims	were	allowed	representation	through	the	forming	of	‘civil	parties’	to	the	litigation,
mostly	organised	by	Chadian	lawyers.
Reagan’s	US	Administration	was	one	of	the	foreign	powers	to	help	prop	up	Hissène	Habré
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The	EAC	thus	provides	us	with	some	interesting	lessons	as	attempts	are	now	being	made	to	set	up	similar	hybrid
trials	in	other	African	countries.	As	efforts	to	establish	a	court	for	South	Sudan	have	been	delayed	by	political
blockages	and	the	fact	that	political	violence	there	has	not	yet	ceased,	the	EAC	has	shown	us	how	a	court	could	be
established	in	another	country	—	in	this	case	Senegal	where	Habré	had	sought	exile	in	1990.	Basing	the	trial	in
Senegal	defused	some	of	the	political	tensions	which	could	have	been	stoked	by	attempting	to	hold	a	trial	in	Chad
itself,	and	removed	the	need	to	extradite	him	abroad	(possibly	to	Europe).
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As	momentum	builds	behind	efforts	to	establish	a	hybrid	trial	to	investigate	human	rights	abuses	in	Central	African
Republic	(CAR),	the	EAC’s	failure	to	secure	the	extradition	of	five	co-accused	former	members	of	Habré’s	secret
police	also	provides	valuable	learning	opportunities	with	regards	to	how	to	choose	who	to	prosecute.	In	the	CAR
there	may	be	many	thousands	of	individual	perpetrators,	and	the	EAC	has	created	much	food	for	thought	about	the
relative	merits	of	going	for	the	top	leadership	or	middle	level	officials	who	may	have	been	more	involved	in	the	day-
to-day	acts	of	torture.
Among	the	situations	being	most	closely	watched	today	is	that	relating	to	the	former	president	of	The	Gambia,	Yahya
Jammeh,	who	fled	into	exile	in	Equatorial	Guinea	in	early	2017	after	losing	a	presidential	election	and	negotiating	his
departure	with	regional	powers.	Reed	Brody	from	Human	Rights	Watch,	who	played	a	major	role	in	bringing	about
Habré’s	trial	before	the	EAC,	has	already	met	victims	of	alleged	human	rights	abuses	under	Jammeh	and	has
expressed	an	interest	in	using	a	similar	approach	in	bringing	a	prosecution.	There	are	certainly	parallels	to	the	Habré
case,	with	Equatorial	Guinea	seeming	to	offer	the	former	president	a	similar	kind	of	protection	that	the	Chadian
leader	enjoyed	for	more	than	ten	years	under	Abdoulaye	Wade	in	Senegal.	Yet	while	the	use	of	universal	jurisdiction
(a	so-called	‘unique	pillar’	of	the	EAC)	is	unpopular	with	many	African	heads	of	state	in	Africa,	it	could	in	theory	be
used	to	secure	Jammeh’s	extradition.
The	EAC	had	a	number	of	other	important	impacts	relevant	to	future	attempts	to	hold	perpetrators	of	atrocities	to
account.	For	the	first	time,	the	outreach	programme	was	run	by	an	independent	consortium.	A	significant	ten	per	cent
of	the	overall	budget	of	the	court	was	dedicated	to	making	sure	its	work	was	understood	in	Chad	itself.	In	addition,
although	the	initial	charge	sheet	neglected	to	specifically	list	crimes	involving	sexual	violence	(of	which	there	were
many),	after	dramatic	accusations	during	the	witness	phase	that	Habré	himself	had	raped	one	of	the	victims,	the
presiding	trial	judge	took	the	unusual	step	of	amending	the	original	charges	to	include	sexual	violence.	This	helped	to
re-focus	the	legal	community’s	attention	to	the	issue,	and	has	been	welcomed	by	campaign	groups.
Of	course,	the	EAC	did	not	succeed	in	everything.	The	failure	to	secure	the	extradition	of	the	five	co-accused,	five
top	agents	in	Habré’s	Direction	of	Documentation	and	Security,	did	not	go	down	well	in	Chad	itself	where	many
ordinary	people	are	still	questioning	where	the	responsibility	for	everyday	torture	in	the	prisons	of	the	1980s	truly	lies.
This	was	compounded	by	Habré’s	stubborn	vow	of	silence	during	the	trial	and	his	refusal	to	co-operate	in	any	way
with	his	court-appointed	defence	team.	In	addition,	the	EAC	neglected	to	investigate	the	role	of	international	powers,
specifically	the	US	and	France,	in	facilitating	Habré’s	rise	to	power	through	the	covert	supply	of	intelligence	and
weapons	via	the	CIA.	Finally,	the	EAC	has	also	made	little	progress	in	securing	contributions	to	a	Trust	Fund	for
victims	which	was	mandated	during	the	Appeals	phase	—	although	$5	million	was	recently	committed	to	the	Trust
Fund	by	the	African	Union.	This	is	only	a	fraction	of	the	81m	Euros	($100m)	ordered	by	the	EAC	judges.
In	the	aftermath	of	Habré’s	conviction,	the	AU	were	keen	to	promote	the	success	of	the	EAC	and	a	roundtable	event
was	held	at	the	AU	summit	in	2017	exploring	how	the	reputation	of	the	trial	as	an	‘African	solution	to	African
problems’	could	be	built	upon.	While	it	still	appears	true	that	the	most	important	reason	why	a	prosecution	eventually
goes	ahead	would	be	that	the	conditions	are	right	and	a	trial	becomes	politically	acceptable	or	even	desirable	(in	this
case	Habré	had	been	out	of	power	for	25	years	and	abandoned	by	his	erstwhile	supporters),	the	story	of	the	EAC
nevertheless	offers	us	an	example	of	a	tenacious	effort	to	bring	about	a	trial	which,	through	its	status	as	an	‘African’
hybrid	court,	allowed	it	to	become	acceptable	in	many	parts	of	the	continent.
This	article	was	first	published	on	the	Justice	in	Conflict	blog.
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Tyrant	to	Justice	is	her	second	book.
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